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Abstract. This paper utilizes complexity theory to analyze the implications of 
systemic changes that have occurred over the last 30 years in the automotive 
industry. We argue by dint of complexity analysis that the networked auto-
motive production system characterized by just-in-time and lean production cre-
ates states far from equilibrium in individual parts manufacturers and assembly 
plants. Positive feedback creates system disturbances and adverse health and 
safety issues in the local plant environments. In addition, we examine four mech-
anisms that serve as negative feedback loops to absorb stresses in local plant 
environments and rectify health and safety related issues. This paper draws on 
thirty interviews with health and safety representatives at automotive manufac-
turing and assembly plants.
Résumé. Ce papier utilise la théorie de complexité pour analyser les implications 
de changements systémiques qui se sont produits pendant les trente dernières 
années dans l’industrie automotrice. Nous soutenons, au moyen de l’analyse de 
complexité, que le système de production automoteur en réseau, caractérisé par 
la production juste à temps et mince, crée des états loin de l’équilibre dans les 
fabricants de parties individuels et les usines d’assembleur. Les rétroactions po-
sitives créent des dérangements dans le système qui causent des conditions dé-
favorables de santé et sécurité dans les environs locaux de l’usine. En plus, nous 
examinons quatre mécanismes qui servent comme boucles de rétroactions néga-
tives pour absorber ces tensions environnementales, et résoudre les problèmes de 
santé et sécurité. Ce papier est comprit de trente entretiens avec des représentants 
de santé et sécurité venant des usines fabricants et d’assemblage automotrices.
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introduCtion
Over the last 30 years, the global automotive industry has gone through massive restructuring, with the conversion from a hierarch-
ically oriented, vertically integrated bureaucracy to a horizontal network 
consisting of lead firms (in the North American context, Ford, Daim-
ler-Chrysler and General Motors and Japanese transplants) and various 
levels of part suppliers. Concomitant with this shift is the global emer-
gence of just-in-time and lean production and the diminution of mass 
production. While this new network arrangement promises greater or-
ganizational flexibility and these production programs offer efficiency 
over their predecessors, the combination brings greater levels of com-
plexity. This paper follows the complexity turn in sociology (see Urry 
2003; 2005a) and utilizes complexity theory to analyze the impact of 
these changes on the automotive industry. Complexity theory examines 
the physics of populations and their emergent and self-organizing sys-
temic properties (Law and Urry 2004; Cilliers 1998). Using the tools 
developed in nascent theorizations of complexity, we analyze the emer-
gence of the networked automotive production system and the nonlinear 
effects of this system on local plant environments and the workers who 
inhabit them. We argue, using complexity analysis, that the networked 
automotive production system of just-in-time and lean production cre-
ates states far from equilibrium in individual parts manufacturers and 
assembly plants. Lastly, we consider negative feedback mechanisms that 
attempt to stabilize the system. 
Positive feedback, in the form of deficient preventative maintenance 
and housekeeping, produces health and safety issues in the local plant 
environments. Joint health and safety committees, collective bargaining 
agreements, the governmental system, and the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (ISO) TS16949 and 14000 standards serve as 
negative feedback mechanisms to absorb stresses to local plant environ-
ments and rectify health and safety related issues. 
Our complexity analysis of the North American automotive industry, 
compared to typical Weberian and Marxist approaches to organizations, 
offers a theoretically nuanced conceptualization of the impact of internal 
disturbances on organizations and the effect of those internal disturb-
ances on other organizations within a network. This analysis contributes 
to the current literature on complexity theory which has not been empir-
ically grounded in the lived experiences of people affected by complex 
systems. 
This paper is structured in six main sections. In the first section, we 
offer an overview of the contours of complexity theory and situate the 
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complexity paradigm within past theoretical, epistemological, and onto-
logical positions. In the following section, the metaphors and tools of 
complexity are defined. In the third section, we consider complex organ-
izations as spaces of chaos and order and the shift from the vertically in-
tegrated bureaucracy to a networked morphology of organizations. This 
is succeeded by the methods of this study. In the fifth section, based on 
the data gathered from the health and safety representatives, we present 
and analyze the networked automotive production system consisting of 
just-in-time and lean production. In the final section, we examine the im-
pact of positive and negative feedback in automotive production plants. 
ContourS of Complexity theory
According to Urry (2005a), a complexity turn in the physical “hard” sci-
ences has made its way into the social sciences (see also, Urry 2003; 
Byrne 2005). This is based on the emergence of a more general “com-
plex structure of feeling” that confronts some quotidian notions of social 
order (Maasen and Weingart 2000; Thrift 1999). Derived from chaos and 
systems theory, complexity theory is concerned with changes that do not 
fit into a simple linear law of distinct cause and corresponding effect 
(Byrne 1998). Unabashedly systems oriented, complexity theory stresses 
that there are various networked time-space paths, often immense dis-
proportions between causes and effects, and volatile yet irrevocable pat-
terns that seem to typify all social and physical systems (Urry 2003:7). 
Complexity is a theoretical framework and ontology, insofar as it 
is grounded in the ontological claim that the contemporary, globalized 
world is complex. Systems in complexity theory occupy the space be-
tween order and chaos, that is, they are in balance (Cilliers 1998; Urry 
2003, 2005b).2 System components are never fully stabilized nor do they 
dissolve into anarchy. As Urry (2003:22) states, “there is a kind of ‘or-
derly disorder’ present within all such dynamic systems.” Complexity 
theory is different from chaos theory which deals with simple, deter-
ministic, nonlinear, dynamic closed systems that are sensitive to initial 
conditions. Complexity theory focuses on nonlinear open systems that 
2. Within the complexity literature, there is a debate regarding the nature of 
complex systems. On one side, Byrne (1998) contends that complex systems 
operate at “the edge of chaos.” Following Cilliers (1998), the position that 
we hold is that complex systems operate between order and chaos. The main 
point of contention, as far as we are concerned, is that a system that only 
behaved chaotically, or at the edge of chaos, would be useless and cease to 
produce anything. On the other hand, a system characterized by order would 
have very little capacity for adaptation and result in death of the system.
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interact with their environments (Gatrell 2004). Open systems interact 
with other systems and their environments producing various nonlinear 
effects. 
In contradistinction to positivistic linear accounts, and crucial to 
complexity theory, is the position that knowledge is inherently local and 
contextual rather than universal (Byrne 2005; Cilliers 1998). Challenging 
the nomothetic project of positivism, complexity theory is dynamic, pri-
marily concerned with description and explication of patterns of change 
in a given system and its particular local effects (Byrne 2005). Complex-
ity theory also differs from the systems-based theories of Parsons and 
Luhmann. While systems theory focuses on problem solving, prediction, 
and control, complexity analysts undertake exploratory research focus-
ing on explanation and understanding. In addition, while relations and 
networks figure in the work of systems and complexity theory, complex-
ity places central importance on emergence  and hybrids that result from 
systems (Gatrell 2004). 
toolS and metaphorS of Complexity theory
This recent complexity turn has been labeled (Urry 2004) the “new 
social physics.” Metaphors and concepts are often drawn from quan-
tum physics and its emphasis on nonlinear systems. Complexity theory 
places systems at the centre of analysis, examining how systems adapt 
and evolve as they self-organize through time (see Mitleton-Kelly 2003). 
A system in complexity theory comprises various components and sub-
systems embedded within systems that have their own respective com-
ponents. An example of a system in social science (Gatrell 2004:2662) is 
a transport network that transfers people and materials from one place to 
another. Systems, then, include hybrids of social and material compon-
ents, or in Lash and Urry’s (1994) conceptualization, they are “material 
worlds.” In a global sense, the world comprises various systems, func-
tioning at manifold levels and scales, each comprising the environment 
for each other (Urry 2003; 2005b). A system is characterized as complex 
only when it consists of such intricate sets of nonlinear relationships and 
feedback loops that it cannot be analyzed as a whole (Cilliers 1998:3).3 
3. With respect to the difference between complicated and complex systems, 
Cilliers (1998) is particularly instructive. A system is complicated when it 
has a large number of components and performs sophisticated tasks, but in 
a way that can be analyzed or modeled fairly accurately. A complex system 
can be differentiated from a complicated system insofar as it is made up of 
extremely intricate sets of nonlinear relationships and feedback loops; only 
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Focus is also on the effects of relations and connections between differ-
ent elements. 
A central tenet of complexity theory is that all living and social sys-
tems involve a process of self-making and self-organizing or autopoi-
esis. Autopoietic systems involve a network of production processes in 
which the role of each component is to participate in the production or 
transformation of other components in the network. In this sense, the 
network continually makes itself (Byrne 1998; Capra 1997; Prigogine 
1997; Cilliers 1998; Gatrell 2004). A prime example of an autopoietic 
system is the Internet (Urry 2005b:246–7). Users across the globe, not 
business or state bureaucracies, are the key producers of the technology. 
“[The Internet] possesses an elegant, non-hierarchical rhizomatic global 
structure and is based upon lateral, horizontal hypertext links that render 
the boundaries between objects within the archive endlessly fluid” (Urry 
2005b:247). From autopoietic systems, new structures and behaviours 
emerge vis-à-vis the continual interaction of system components (Hol-
land 1998; Cilliers 1998).  
Autopoietic systems characterized by emergence and hybridity are 
also far from balanced. Systems in complexity theory are nonlinear inso-
far as there is no consistent relationship between a specific cause and cor-
responding effect. Rather, the same cause, in specific circumstances, can 
produce drastically different kinds of effect (Cilliers 1998; Byrne 1998; 
Urry 2003; 2005b). Emergence signifies what happens when there is 
movement from one aggregation level to another. Organizing and organ-
ization, then, are names often ascribed to movement between aggregation 
levels (Letiche and Boje 2001). Emergence can be political engagement 
within a given system, sometimes resulting in systemic patterning. 
With the emergence of patterns within networks, attractors are estab-
lished. An attractor is a control mechanism in a dynamic system which 
does not move through all possible parts of a phase space but instead 
occupies a restricted part of it. However, when a specific attractor or key 
control parameter in a system changes its value by an amount three times 
greater than the value in the previous cycle, it becomes a Lorenz or strange 
attractor. In a dynamic system, strange attractors produce massive effects 
in all the other components in the system; small causes can have massive 
(nonlinear) system-wide effects. Through path dependence, these effects 
can create changes to the entire system; irreversible contingent events set 
in motion institutional patterns with long-term deterministic properties. 
An example of path-dependence is the introduction of the fax machine 
in the office, creating a tipping point in the international communicative 
certain aspects of these systems can be analyzed at any one time. Attempts to 
predict behaviour of complex systems results in distortions.
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system and making fax machines a necessity in all Western offices (see 
Gladwell 2000). 
Based on the nonlinearity of causes and effects in systems, complex-
ity theory stresses positive feedback loops rather than negative feed-
back loops. Positive feedback loops can exacerbate initial stresses in the 
system, preventing it from restoring equilibrium by absorbing shocks 
(Urry 2003:13; see also, Hayles 1991; 1999). Positive feedback happens 
when a change tendency is dramatically reinforced rather than dampened 
down; network composition removes the central hierarchical governing 
structure which could reduce the continual stresses to the system caused 
by positive feedback (Urry 2003). Positive feedback loops set events in 
motion that can produce irreversible and uncertain outcomes, creating 
system failure and breakdown. It is only through negative feedback loops 
acting as control mechanisms that these system effects are dampened 
down.
the Complexity of organizationS
Perrow (1984) in his now classic work, Normal Accidents, employs the 
language of complexity to explain accidents in organizations. He shows 
that in tightly coupled systems of production, recovery even from minor 
initial disturbances is impossible. The consequences spread rapidly, cha-
otically, and irreversibly through the system, producing system accidents 
rather than accidents caused by individual error (Perrow 1984:11). In this 
same vein, Serres (1982:127) states that organizations inhabit the space 
between “order and noise, between disorder and perfect harmony.” Law 
(1994:132) argues that organizations are based on ordering and “ignor-
ing; simplifying; fixing; what is complex for a moment in a stable form.” 
More recently, Clegg, Kornberger, and Rhodes (2005) in their analysis of 
the “learning” organization, posit that organizations endemically occupy 
the space between order and chaos. They assert that the ontology of or-
ganizations is one of increasing complexity and reducing it, ordering and 
disordering, and these characteristics are interdependent, supplementary, 
and parasitic (Clegg, Kornberger, and Rhodes 2005:153). Out of this im-
broglio of chaos and order, organizations are continually becoming, or in 
complexity terms, new organizational forms emerge. 
Along with the recognition that organizations are at the intersec-
tion of chaos and order, there has been recognition that organizations 
have entered into a network paradigm (Borgatti and Foster 2003; see 
Beck 2000) or, as Castells (1996; 2000) puts it, the “network enterprise.” 
With the shift from Fordist production systems to post-Fordist produc-
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tion systems, there was a concomitant shift from mass standardization to 
flexible customization at the core value of production, distribution, and 
consumption (Barney 2004). Spreading across and restructuring organ-
izations, adding to the complexity of organizational life, this shift engen-
dered the model of the network: a web of interconnected firms or nodes 
organized within specific systems of production. The nodes are intercon-
nected by multiple, easily reconfigured ties through which a variety of 
flows can pass; the interconnection of computers emerges as particularly 
apt for achieving flexibility in economic systems. This new network 
configuration is marked by the agility and flexibility necessary to react 
to continually changing demand cycles, markets, and technological in-
novations (see Castells 1996; 2000; 2001; Barney 2004). This network 
morphology has virtually wiped out the insulated and intrinsically rigid, 
vertically integrated bureaucracy with its slow-moving formal processes 
and layers of middle management. Apologists for bureaucracy like Du 
Gay (1994; 2000) and Kallinikos (2004) defend an organizational form 
that has not existed for some time.  
However, this new, networked organization is not without its prob-
lems. The path dependence of the network organization form brought 
with it disequilibrium unseen in the vertically integrated bureaucracy. 
Networks are autopoietic, insofar as nodes come together for specific 
projects. These formations rely on all other nodes in the network and in 
order to function, the production systems of all of the nodes must run 
smoothly. Since speed and flexibility are necessities, small problems in 
one node’s production system can have massive effects on the rest of the 
nodes within the network. Positive feedback can send the network into a 
state of extreme disequilibrium (Urry 2003). Consequently, and not un-
related, system dysfunction can detrimentally affect the subsystem phase 
spaces of individual nodes. 
The following offers a complexity theory account of the networked 
automotive production system and looks at how disturbances in one pro-
duction system can create disequilibriums within their own plants or 
phase spaces and in other firms’ or nodes’ phase spaces in the network. 
Through a complexity analytic, the remainder of this paper examines 
the role of just-in-time and lean production in creating specific disequil-
libriums within different leveled production plants or phase spaces of 
the networked automotive production system. We argue that positive 
feedback engendered by these systems cause health and safety problems, 
most acutely in the area of preventative maintenance and housekeeping, 
sometimes resulting in repetitive strain injuries. Lastly, we examine sev-
eral components of automotive manufacturing environments that act as 
negative feedback mechanisms. 
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methodS
This research was conducted in southern Ontario, a hub of automotive 
manufacturing in Canada, between 2001 and 2004. During that period, 
the automotive sector was relatively stable. The research was conducted 
prior to a period of major restructuring, plant closures, and significant 
layoffs in late 2005 and 2006. Our cohort consisted of union health and 
safety representatives from Canadian Auto Workers local unions. These 
representatives regularly participate in joint health and safety commit-
tees. They were either elected in local union elections or appointed by 
the union leadership. Most of the representatives had more than 5 years’ 
experience in health and safety; some had more than 20 years of experi-
ence. The majority of the subject companies had been in business for 
about 30 years; one of the newer firms was established in the late 1990s. 
Health and safety representatives were drawn from Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) vehicle assembly plants, Tier 1 and Tier 2 part sup-
plier plants. The firms were engaged in all aspects of automotive manu-
facturing including tool and die operations, metal stamping, foam injec-
tion, cleaning, and assembly.
The process of lean production was selectively phased into the auto-
motive manufacturing sector over a period of 20 years beginning some-
time in the late 1970s (Landsbergis, Cahill, and Schnall 1999; Lewchuck 
and Robertson 1996). As Lewchuck and Robertson (1996) identified in 
the Ontario jurisdiction and other authors (Young 1992; Clement and 
Myles 1994; Kochan and Lansbury 1997; Rinehart, Huxley, and Rob-
ertson 1997) have noted in multiple jurisdictions, the cultural, political, 
and economic climates all influenced the extent to which lean production 
was introduced and accepted by different work places. The fluid intro-
duction of lean production made it amenable to our qualitative methods. 
Following their systematic review of the health and safety literature, 
MacEachen et al. (2006) argue that a qualitative approach adds an im-
portant dimension to health and safety research and is gaining general 
acceptance in the field of health research. This includes the opportunity 
to discover the workers’ indigenous knowledge of their environment. 
Kramer and Wells (2005) describe this kind of knowledge as both pol-
itical and instrumental, aimed at implementing a joint goal: modifying 
work processes and improving the health of workers. 
Health and safety representatives and local union presidents were 
asked to complete questionnaires. We made phone calls to encourage 
responses and finally received responses from more than 50 percent of 
potential union locals. Respondents were asked to participate in an inter-
view and thirty agreed. Semi-structured interviews, lasting about one 
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hour in length, were conducted in the union office, respondent’s homes, 
and at the workplace, where workers had access to private offices. The 
interviews were focused on general details about their respective plants 
and health and safety related issues. Data from the interviews were ana-
lyzed and the themes were compared with the questionnaire responses. 
Worker representatives’ responses indicated that housekeeping and pre-
ventative maintenance were critical factors in maintaining a safe work-
place on the one hand and a source of many of the accidents their col-
leagues suffered in the workplace. Supplementary structured interviews 
were conducted with many of the worker representatives to clarify their 
understanding of housekeeping and preventative maintenance, further 
confirming their views on the role of housekeeping and preventative 
maintenance.
lean produCtion and JuSt-in-time 
Beginning in the 1980s, the vertically integrated Fordist production 
model was criticized for its rigidity and lack of flexibility in continually 
changing and diverse global markets (see Piore and Sabel 1984; Deyo 
1996:2; Beck 2000:77). Lead firms began to contract out as a method of 
reducing costs, improving asset efficiency, and increasing profits in the 
global competitive markets (Clott 2004; Zullo 2004). The resultant pro-
duction system, displacing the older vertically integrated bureaucracy, 
was a horizontal network comprising lead firms (in the North American 
context, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler and General Motors, and Japanese 
transplants)4 and different levels of “tiered” part supplier firms (Castells 
1996:160, 164; Sabel 1993; Casper and Hancke 1999:964).5 As a result 
of the restructuring of the industry, in an autopoietic fashion, there was 
the creation of a networked automotive production system, comprising an 
4. Since the beginning of the 1980s, Japanese transplants have become more 
prominent in the North American automotive industry. Rutherford (2000:740), 
indicates the growing number of Japanese plants in the US and Canada, argu-
ing that in comparison to North American assemblers, Japanese transplants 
are pursuing supply relations characterized by more information transfer and 
the development of longer term contracts with their Tier 1 part suppliers.
5. To understand the tiering system, according to global value chain analysts 
(Gereffi 1994:97; Humphrey 2003:122), products have to go through a suc-
cession of activities in the passage from raw materials to the market. Like-
wise, products go through a range of stages within the production chain to add 
more “value” to the part as it makes its way to the customer. Consequently, 
tiers denote the level to which value is added to a part destined for a car. For 
example, Tier 2s and 3s are usually involved with the manufacturing of raw 
materials that are sent on to the Tier 1 suppliers for assembly.
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elaborate supply chain network, in which nodes coalesce around specific 
projects (Castells 1996; 2000). 
Along with the shift to a networked automotive production system, 
two main production programs have emerged, characterizing this new 
system: lean production and just-in-time. Facing near economic bank-
ruptcy after WWII and plagued by poor production rates, Japanese car-
maker, Toyota, developed these production programs. In a path dependent 
fashion, by the mid-1980s, they had spread across the world (Womack, 
Roos, and Jones, 1990). All automotive plants in this study operate under 
just-in-time and all have characteristics of lean production. 
Lean production, compared to mass production, relies on half the 
human effort in the factory, half the manufacturing space, half the in-
vestment tools, half the engineering hours, and half the time to develop 
new products. Accordingly, leading proponents of lean production posit 
several principles, which include teamwork, communication, efficient 
use of resources, the elimination of wastes, and continuous improve-
ment (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990), resulting in more value for the 
customer. With the diffusion of lean production into North American 
and European automotive firms in the 1980s, many analysts suggest that 
these principles are not completely taken up in plants; rather firms adopt 
certain aspects that are perceived to be beneficial, while operating trad-
itionally in other areas (Seppala and Klemola 2004). 
Certain elements of lean production, especially standardization and 
work intensification, were derived from principles of scientific manage-
ment promoted by F.W. Taylor (see Braverman 1974). This has led some 
to argue that lean production is a myth, or rather, that lean production is 
no more than hyper-Taylorism (see Linge 1991). While lean production 
places emphasis on reducing labour cost by increasing the pace of work, 
it also attempts to integrate workers’ input into the organization of work 
and work processes. There is a resulting shift in responsibility onto work-
ers to enforce quality control standards and a high degree of integration 
of conceptual activity and the execution of production tasks (Kochan and 
Lansbury 1997). Due to lean production’s emphasis on physical strength 
and mental skills, it should be viewed as distinctly different, and signifi-
cantly contrary to Taylorism. 
The most salient feature of lean production is the efficient use of 
resources. This is achieved by adjusting human resources, removing 
restrictive rules on work assignments (job classifications), developing 
multifunctional workers, job rotation, and widening or narrowing the 
range of jobs done by each worker (Rinehart, Huxley, and Robertson 
1997:27). Accordingly, a key organizational element of a truly lean pro-
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duction plant is that the utmost number of tasks and responsibilities are 
transferred to those workers actually adding value to the car on the line. 
Eradication of waste in the production system means continually 
removing actions that are not required in product production and con-
sequently, do not add value to the customer (Seppala and Klemola 2004). 
The target is to produce a tighter, more fluid, production system through 
operations, design, or structural changes to the production process. Lean 
production systems comprise a tighter coordination of production and 
the elimination of wasted time and space (Leslie and Butz 1998:360). A 
worker under lean production is assigned nonproduction responsibilities 
in addition to normal production requirements, maximizing the number 
of tasks performed. Increasing the number of tasks, in turn, decreases the 
rest time between work cycles. A worker in this environment is not allo-
cated slack time; it is required, as Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990:103) 
mention, that “every worker try very hard.”
Coupled with and directly related to the continual emphasis on the 
eradication of waste is the use of just-in-time delivery (JIT), devoted to 
the seamless connection between the production system and the custom-
er. Inventories and buffers are reduced; the aim is to minimize the use of 
buffers and rest time by exposing weaknesses in the production system 
and addressing them immediately (Fairris and Tohyama 2002). Under 
JIT, parts are pulled through the production system destined for the cus-
tomer. The “pull” within JIT then serves as the driver of the production 
system. The goal is to synchronize timing to meet the customers’ needs 
for parts on an as-needed basis (Womack and Jones 1996).
poSitive and negative feedbaCk
Positive Feedback Loops
Positive feedback occurs when a change tendency is reinforced rather 
than dampened down. Network composition removes a central governing 
hierarchical structure which could dampen down the stresses to the sys-
tem and between systems caused by positive feedback (Urry 2003). Posi-
tive feedback can intensify initial stresses in complex systems, leading 
in some cases to endemic failures (Urry 2003; see Perrow 1984). In this 
study, it was found that positive feedback has a compounding effect lead-
ing to disequilibriums throughout phase spaces in the system. With the 
continued emphasis on cutting out nonvalue-added labour, firms have 
cut housekeeping and machine maintenance staff (see, Rinehart, Hux-
ley, and Robertson 1997). Health and safety representatives report that 
housekeeping and preventative maintenance issues can pose problems 
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to the networked automotive production system and create health and 
safety problems. In the cases where there was a reduction in preventative 
maintenance staff, health and safety representatives stated that it had a 
detrimental impact on the production system.  
Interviewee #19: I’ve heard of it where I am where we affect the cus-
tomer. So we’re the third or second person in the food chain. We’ll in fact, 
the customer, [names company] would be a name that comes to mind, or 
[names company] who, we will supply [names company] or [names com-
pany] subsidiaries that manipulate a part before it goes on. So we’ve shut 
them down in the past due to quality or production issues. 
Interviewee #2: When you downsize all your departments, something has 
to be impacted by that decision. And as a result, some things go unchecked 
for longer periods of time. If you have the resources in place of course you 
can have your preventative maintenance program a hundred percent and 
another area a hundred percent. But when you cut back, it tends to affect 
that area. So you kind of, you can, so you find yourself in a situation where 
you’re repairing things as they break down or as needed. You’re not look-
ing for problems at that point.
Interviewee #26: So the problem is with the just-in-time and a lack of 
maintenance is when the line has been down for four hours, now instead 
of making four hundred parts they’d really like to make five hundred parts 
an hour. And some people will try . . . some people will hurt themselves 
trying. 
Interviewee #17: Well yes, in some cases they don’t have the manpower or 
the maintenance men [sic] or the tool makers to do preventative mainten-
ance. They just do maintenance just to keep it going, you know. So, and at 
times, you’ll have like an engineer or something like that, he works steady 
days. Well the other night, he worked until ten o’clock at night, you know 
because something would break down. New technologies. Big thing in the 
industry now. There’s all different kinds of new safety devices, protective 
tooling that is implemented. I might be getting a little bit off topic here, 
but they just put out one fire and another one is burning them right in the 
butt right away.
These responses show that under lean production, where there is 
an insufficient preventative maintenance staff, internal disequilibriums 
are created in the production system. Where on-time delivery to other 
nodes in the network is crucial, disturbances to the system reveal the 
fragility of lean production and just-in-time (see Womack, Jones, and 
Roos 1990:103). Specifically, in mass production systems, parts were 
stockpiled “just in case,” but with limited stockpiling in just-in-time, the 
networked automotive production system can be shut down when firms 
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in the network have machine breakdowns. When not addressed, machine 
breakdown can momentarily slow the production system and, as shown 
in the first two responses, create a debilitating effect to the system. The 
third respondent revealed that the combination of reduced staff and the 
intensification of the production system associated with just-in-time cre-
ates situations where machine breakdowns can have an adverse affect on 
the efficiency of the production system and affect delivery quotas as well 
as the bodies of workers. In the fourth response, stresses to the networked 
automotive production system, in the form of machine breakdown, be-
comes positive feedback where the system is continually faltering.
The literature on just-in-time and lean production has generally 
shown that the combination intensifies the work process (see, for ex-
ample, Leslie and Butz 1998; Yates, Lewchuck, and Stewart 2001; Fair-
ris and Tohyama 2002). Part of lean production is transferring the utmost 
of tasks to on-the-line production workers. In some cases, workers have 
the added responsibility of housekeeping and preventative maintenance 
duties (Graham 1995). The following response reflects the work intensi-
fication that results from just-in-time and lean production with the added 
responsibility of housekeeping duties.
I: Why would they want you to have smaller quantities more often?
Interviewee 26: Inventory turnover. What we were talking about earlier, 
leaner production, just-in-time. It’s kind of, instead of having a six months 
supply of parts on hand, we’re down to about four weeks supply of parts. 
Order less quantities, less inventory to hold, more repetitive movement on 
the parts. . . . The most common problem for us is repetitive strain, back 
injuries . . . you’re doing the same part over and over and over within a 
cycled time, maybe once a minute or once every forty-seven seconds. . . .
Interviewee 5: In terms of housekeeping, which is sort of a requirement 
for everybody and their individual workstations, there is a lot of pressure 
to produce more. And because there’s pressure to produce as much as 
possible, you’d be less inclined to keep your area in good order because, 
because you’re, you’re spending all your energies towards maintaining an 
expected production standard. So therefore, something usually suffers.
The first case shows how the intensification of the work process as-
sociated with just-in-time and lean production results in repetitive strain 
injuries. With production constantly paramount over housekeeping, the 
second representative reveals the endemic nature of housekeeping prob-
lems. In this case, the intensification of the work process left little time 
for housekeeping tasks, which inevitably suffered. The necessary task 
of maintaining order is not addressed, creating a chaotic production en-
vironment filled with clutter. 
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Nichols’ (1997) examination of industrial injuries in Britain found 
that most serious injuries resulted from slips, trips, and falls in the work-
place. Representatives in this study indicated that housekeeping and 
preventative maintenance-related hazards were, in some cases, the fore-
most health and safety problem in their respective plants. The following 
responses reflect the impact of reduced preventative maintenance and 
janitorial staff on health and safety.  
I: In terms of your plant, what’s the biggest health and safety issue?
Interviewee 11: At the health and safety meeting, that I’m trying to think 
of an umbrella, sort of, ’cause we’ve got so many small ones, so many 
small issues we’re continually chasing. I guess I would have to say pre-
ventative maintenance. That’s where everything seems to sort of fall apart, 
that doesn’t get done, the preventative maintenance doesn’t get done, so 
then you are running into hazards and then accidents, and then it just 
grows from there because they don’t have the time or the desire to do the 
preventative maintenance.
Interviewee 16: In this manufacturing process, a lot of coolants are be-
ing used. The coolants, by their nature, leak out from machines. They 
leak onto the floor. The walking, the working surfaces and it is constant 
problem with reduced housekeeping, getting the floors clean so you can 
prevent slips and trips and falls, etcetera. And getting them on time. Slips 
and trips are one of the largest contributing factors to industrial injury in 
the facility I represent.
I: Now as you know this is a health and safety survey and the first ques-
tion I have for you is, what is the most important health and safety issue 
in your work place?
Interviewee 22: I would say coolant leaks from the machines due to the 
lack of preventative maintenance. Because we only have one janitor, days 
and afternoons. We don’t have one on midnights and they’re rarely being 
cleaned up, the spills. So they’re looking at it as slip and fall accidents.
The first response shows that the reduction in preventative mainten-
ance staff leads to machine break downs, which, in turn, cause hazards 
and ultimately accidents. In both the second and third responses, the re-
duction in housekeeping and preventative maintenance staff creates a 
compound effect where spills occur, but are not cleaned up, ultimately 
resulting in slip and fall accidents. All open systems interact with their 
environments and can cause states of disequilibrium, as is evident in 
this study. The combination of just-in-time and lean production has the 
effect of intensifying the work process, causing the system to falter in 
other areas like housekeeping and preventative maintenance. As shown 
in these responses, positive feedback can have a cumulative effect caus-
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ing further stresses to the system and its environment. The phase space 
of the production system becomes chaotic, ultimately causing physical 
harm to the individuals inhabiting the phase space. Only through nega-
tive feedback is there restoration of some order.
Negative Feedback Loops
Negative feedback counteracts positive feedback and acts as a control 
mechanism to move systems closer to a state of equilibrium. In Par-
sonian theory, negative feedbacks in organizations are internal control 
mechanisms which maintain systems in states of equilibrium. Key to 
this are cybernetic systems that transfer information, of disturbances and 
other important information, continuously throughout an organization 
(Parsons 1977). Whether negative feedbacks loops were ever as effective 
at restoring order as Parsons claims is a debatable point, but the shift to 
networked forms of organization and the globalization of the automotive 
industry has significantly reduced the effectiveness of these older control 
mechanisms within organizations. 
While these changes were occurring in the automotive industry, the 
occupational health and safety environment was undergoing change. In 
Canada and around the world, governments began to recognize the sig-
nificance and cost associated with poor health and safety practices. In 
the late 1970s, the Ontario government introduced an “Internal Respon-
sibility System” to augment services provided by the Ministry of Labour 
(Lewchuck, Robb, and Walters 1996; O’Grady 2000). The workplace 
parties were required to work together to promote safe work environ-
ments, while regulatory enforcement was left to the government. Since 
the late 1990s the government’s responsibility has been shared by the 
Workplace Safety Insurance Board (WSIB), which took over primary 
responsibility for education, research, and prevention, while the Ministry 
of Labour continues to identify companies that have a record of non-
compliance with the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA). The 
WSIB is a statutory body which provides compensation to most workers 
in the province from premiums collected from employers. 
Participants’ responses revealed a complex structure of health and 
safety responsiveness consisting of four separate negative feedback 
loops including (1) Joint health and safety committees, (2) collective 
bargaining agreements, (3) the governmental system, and (4) the ISO TS 
16949 and 14000 series standards. In the following analysis, we examine 
these four negative feedback loops and their impact on housekeeping 
and preventative maintenance and health and safety more broadly. 
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The first and arguably most effective negative feedback mechanism 
is the joint health and safety committee. In companies with more than 
20 employees, these committees are mandated by law. They consist of 
management and union representatives. These forums provide an op-
portunity for workplace parties to resolve issues that recur in the work 
environment and require systemic management attention.6 Joint health 
and safety committees process and act on the information gleaned from 
the workplace and external knowledge sources (see Hall et al. 2006). A 
health and safety representative reveals the cybernetic nature of gaining 
information on health and safety issues:
Interviewee #4: Well we’ve got four ways that we get information to our, 
we have task meetings weekly and then our monthly health and safety 
meetings. For our weekly task meetings we draw information from ac-
cident reports, so an accident has already happened. A hazard or a poten-
tial hazard or near miss. Our monthly inspections. And then just workers 
bringing it to our attention. Or sometimes it’s even supervisors because 
our supervisors get nowhere with our management, so they come to the 
worker rep and get things addressed that way.
As shown in this response, information flows from the workers to the 
committee in manifold ways and helps to keep the committee abreast of 
the issues in the factory environment. Often in a direct, hands-on man-
ner through inspections or through shop floor workers reporting to the 
representatives, information flows up through the organization so that it 
can be processed by the members of the committee. On the other hand, 
health and safety representatives use sources external to their organiza-
tion to be processed by the joint health and safety committees. This is 
reflected in the following two responses: 
Interviewee #25: We’ve got a lot of, like when we have our annual confer-
ences in Port Elgin, we’ve got a lot of people to draw from. And we have, 
usually we have an idea sharing seminar where somebodys [sic] worked at 
Ford, where something happens which [is the] same in all the plants. And 
then we have smaller plants that don’t have the big representation that are 
invited to these conferences and they can pick up from that as well. And 
6. Joint health and safety committees in Ontario began in the 1970s as a conse-
quence of concerns of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), which 
represented uranium miners. Through the collective bargaining process, a 
joint occupational health and safety committee was created at INCO, the 
county’s largest nickel mine. These original joint health and safety commit-
tees acted in response to individual workplace issues and what happened in 
Sudbury did not necessarily influence what was going on in northern Mani-
toba. Eventually the Ontario government mandated committees for all em-
ployers with more than 20 workers (Occupation Disease Panel 1997).
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the networking is fantastic . . . I don’t see much of a downside in network-
ing because it’s a fantastic resource and it’s easy. 
Interviewee #27: . . . they were complaining of sneezing up black stuff. You 
got ventilation but it’s on the wrong end of the source, it’s past the worker 
and it’s totally insufficient. I’ve shown them on paper where they . . . 
I: So do you guys draw a diagram and take it to the committee?
Interviewee #27: No I went on the Internet and got pictures of what I 
wanted and showed where the problems are, that the ventilation is actually 
behind you and the smoke’s got to go past you to get to the ventilation 
and it’s not working. You got to make some changes. We got it in front of 
them now it’s here.
In the first case, conferences and meetings with other health and 
safety representatives serve as the basis for information transfer with 
other representatives situated in other phase spaces in the networked 
automotive production system. In the latter case, the representative used 
information acquired through the Internet to convince management of 
necessary changes to the ventilation. In both cases, information flows 
into the phase space for the representative to be knowledgeable about, 
and make changes to, existing health and safety conditions. In this sense, 
health and safety knowledge transfer coincides with, and is comple-
mentary to, the networked nature of this system. Under mass produc-
tion, health and safety knowledge remained insular to a firm, whereas the 
networked nature of this system makes it more amenable to knowledge 
transfer (see Kramer and Wells 2005). 
Health and safety representatives noted the power of the committee 
and the utility of gathering information from the shop floor to rectify 
health and safety issues (c.f. Weil 1999; Eaton and Nocerino 2000). This 
is reflected in the following response:
Interviewee #29: Well, the joint health and safety committee is like a driv-
ing force behind it and has a lot of power as far as recommendations and 
because we’re trained in health and safety, we have a little more insight 
into a lot of things that the engineers may have or the management dir-
ectors, etcetera. . . . In my job, I only worry about our joint health and 
safety committee on the floor. And with the power you have, I’ve learned 
is that it’s all business. The power as the committee worker rep you have 
is in your communication to the work force, that’s the power that manage-
ment responds to. Management will respond to something that’s blatant, 
but they overlook a lot of, many, many things because they want, the job 
won’t make them money.
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Information collected through these processes, and the continual 
communication with the workforce, offers the union representatives on 
the committees the political authority to lobby for changes to health and 
safety conditions. This response highlights an element of this negative 
feedback loop which is its weakness, that is, union representatives are re-
liant on cooperation from management to make positive changes in health 
and safety (c.f. Lewchuk, Robb, and Walters 1996). In this response and 
others in this study, health and safety representatives noted that if health 
and safety issues did not align with the economic concerns of manage-
ment they would not be adequately addressed (c.f. Shannon, Robson, and 
Sale 2001:327). Other respondents noted that because housekeeping and 
preventative maintenance were ongoing issues, the committee respon-
siveness was not adequate to quell these day to day problems.
The second negative feedback loop, collective bargaining agreements 
beyond pay issues, is utilized by health and safety representatives to re-
solve long-standing health and safety issues. The Canadian Automotive 
Workers (CAW) Union began to aggressively negotiate health and safety 
issues in the 1990s following its separation from the UAW (Occupa-
tional Disease Panel 1997). Collective bargaining is now used to institute 
health and safety policies and to make changes that increase the com-
pany’s responsiveness to health and safety issues (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 
Kochan, and Wells 1998; Aidt and Tzannatos 2002). Often health and 
safety policies emerge from political action in some phase spaces or or-
ganizations and pattern across other organizations within the networked 
automotive production system. This is referred to as pattern bargaining 
(Carlan et al. 2007). The integration of lean production greatly reduced 
housekeeping and preventative maintenance staff making it a significant 
issue in collective bargaining negotiations. This is reflected in the fol-
lowing response: 
I: And has the number of janitors changed recently?
Interviewee #7: No. We tried to in bargaining, a third one, but they 
wouldn’t go for it. So hoping through health and safety we can push them 
to hire a third janitor.
I: And when you tried to bargain it, how did you, did you bargain under 
health and safety? Did you try that way or how did you, what was your 
push during the bargaining . . . ?
Interviewee #7: Yes, absolutely, straight open through plant cleanliness, 
use of coolant, sanitary washrooms on weekends ’cause we run 24–7 at 
our place.
While collective bargaining strength lies in its efficacy of instituting 
health and safety policies, its effectiveness, like joint health and safety 
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committees, is contingent on the management and worker relations. 
Many of the participants in this study revealed that management used 
“market pressures” and moving facilities to cheaper areas of the globe as 
a fulcrum to keep health and safety expenses to a minimum.7  
The third negative feedback, the governmental system, insures com-
panies in the case of workplace injuries and is responsible for accident 
prevention (Campolieti and Lavis 2000; Bennett 2002). This negative 
feedback comes from the Ministry of Labour and their inspectorate and 
the WSIB who work in tandem with the ministry to identify firms with 
poor health and safety conditions. The WSIB identifies companies that 
have particularly poor accident records in cost, frequency, and/or sever-
ity; the Ministry of Labour identifies companies that have a record of 
noncompliance with the OHSA. A company identified for a Section 82 8 
evaluation by data sets from either the Ministry of Labour and/or the 
WSIB is subject to a WorkWell audit.9 In this case, employers are noti-
fied and meet with an evaluator, who examines the occupational health 
and safety program, observes the employer’s workplace practices on 
site, and interviews workers. If the firm fails a second audit, there is an 
increase in the firm’s base annual premium, depending on the extent and 
seriousness of the health and safety shortfalls. The impact on a com-
pany’s insurance of failing or passing a WorkWell audit, highlights its 
salience. Despite the potential of the WorkWell audit to serve as a battery 
of control (see Power 1997), assuring compliance of firms to a compre-
hensive health and safety standard, the areas covered in the audit have 
notable limitations. For instance, the audit does not make provisions for 
housekeeping duties and therefore, a plant may be riddled with house-
keeping issues and still pass an audit.
The fourth negative feedback loop is the ISO/TS 16949 and ISO 
14000 series standards (see Kartha 2004; Harrington 1999). In the North 
American context, largely due to the restructuring that has occurred, 
Daimler-Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors have imposed quality and 
environmental standards upon their suppliers. All part supplier compan-
ies in this study were required to be certified in the quality assurance 
standard, ISO/TS 16949, and the environmental standard, ISO 14000, to 
7. In their survey of union and management negotiators across the United States, 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Wells (1998) also found that management 
threatened to replace workers and close plants in collective bargaining.
8. Section 82 of the occupational health and safety act (OHSA) permits the 
WSIB to evaluate health and safety conditions in workplaces as factors in 
estimating the likely accident experience of a given company. Insurance pre-
miums reflect the level of industrial risk of a firm. 
9. A WSIB WorkWell audit is a systemic plant-wide evaluation of a given work-
place’s health and safety conditions. 
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supply to Original Equipment Manufacturers. These standards require 
suppliers to have processes for every work procedure in place, assuring 
quality and environmental responsiveness, and are audited for compli-
ance. Participants in this study saw these standards as contributing to 
a greater level of order and to the formulation of processes to react to 
health and safety concerns, in some cases preventative maintenance and 
housekeeping issues. Some participants claimed that they noticed no 
change due to standardization and that management placed emphasis on 
parts of the standards that are efficacious in increasing productivity (c.f. 
Bennett 2002; Spencer 2007). In addition, as interviewee 3 explained to 
us, housekeeping and preventative maintenance issues may have only 
been attended to the week before the performance of audits. 
The criticisms made of the preceding negative feedback mechanisms 
do not suggest that if one, or any combination of them, were able to rect-
ify any of the noted weaknesses, they would emerge as a veritable deus 
ex machina, moving plants dramatically closer to equilibrium. Produc-
tion systems will always operate in disequilibrium and will often have 
detrimental impacts on their local environments. Negative feedback in 
systems maintains a level of order and counteracts the impact of system 
disturbances on phase spaces. In this example, joint health and safety 
committees, collective bargaining, WSIB, and ISO TS16949 and 14000 
standards act as negative feedback mechanisms, lessening the adverse 
effects on health and safety in local plant environments. In addition, a 
move towards integrating housekeeping and preventative maintenance 
more prominently in these negative feedback mechanisms, health and 
safety agendas could have the effect of counteracting lean production 
and its reduction in staff. In turn, this may have the effect of reforming 
the existing production system and repositioning housekeeping and pre-
ventative maintenance duties as not ancillary to the system, but rather 
as essential to its functioning. In line with complex systems, emergent 
processes, in this case intra- and interorganizational politics, hold the 
promise of future, innovative negative feedback loops that may be added 
to or replace the negative feedback considered here. 
ConCluSion
In this paper, we argued, using complexity analysis, that the networked 
automotive production system characterized by just-in-time and lean 
production produces states of disequilibrium in individual parts manu-
facturers and assembly plants and, through positive feedback, creates 
health and safety issues in the local plant environments. In addition, we 
the ComplexitieS of the automotive induStry        285
showed that joint health and safety committees, collective bargaining, 
the governmental system, and ISO TS16949 and 14000 standards serve 
as negative feedback mechanisms to absorb stresses to local plant en-
vironments and work to rectify health and safety related issues. Analyz-
ing the network organization of automotive firms through a complexity 
lens, we contend that organizational environments can be described as 
places operating between order and chaos (Cilliers 1998; Urry 2003). 
We showed how positive feedback can result in system disturbances. 
Through the responses of local health and safety representatives, this 
paper elucidated some of the negative implications that the networked 
automotive productions system has for local plant environments, spe-
cifically in the area of health and safety. In addition, in the case of joint 
health and safety committees, we revealed the cybernetic character of 
this negative feedback mechanism and how this information transfer fa-
cilitates reactions to health and safety issues and ultimately, acts as an or-
dering mechanism in local plant environments. The networked character 
of this system reveals the increase in knowledge transfer resulting from 
this morphology and the effects of internal disturbances in one phase 
space for other nodes in the system. In explicating the effects of these 
systems on local phase spaces, we contribute to the current literature on 
complexity theory which previously has not been empirically grounded 
in the lived experiences of people effected by complex systems. In con-
sidering the role of negative feedback loops, this paper engaged in a 
form of “ontological politics” (Law and Urry 2004), by suggesting the 
potential of these mechanisms to soften the effects of this system on 
workers in plant environments. Suggesting mechanisms for change to 
systems takes the position that we are not enamored by systems, but 
move to enact more beneficial realities for those that bear the effects of 
complex systems that are in disequilibrium. 
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